That is, it deceives, chooses itself exactly as the object of the love. When he was paralizado to the image reflected in the source, of this form, the libido leaves of if directing to the object, to ' ' outro' ' , and he comes back exactly toward itself, for not possessing a representation of the other internalizada one, Narcissus not conquest its subjectivity. Such discovery takes it the desperation and to death (BRANDO, 2002; MODIA, 2008). Brando (2002, p.183, italic and aspa of the author), considers that: The fatal deceit of the young tebano was the wrong choice of the love object. It would be treated, in the case, of a species of warning to the breaking of the impulses of the love, that must be directed to the other. In this in case that, the libido leaves of if directing to the object, to ' ' outro' ' , and it retroacts to a endo-psychic activity: thus, Narcissus would have committed one as that incestuous intrapsquico. Of the subjective point of view of Narcissus, its love really is guided for an object, therefore it discovered a face one human being entrancing beauty and for it if got passionate.
The tragic outcome, however, in the story of Ovdio, (…) is the awareness of Narcissus of that madly it is gotten passionate by its proper image; of that its passion is auto-love, a love of self and not a love for the other. Narcissus was deceived by the image human being, fantasiada, idealized of belaza esplendoraosa in mirror d? gua. Therefore it did not perceive that its object of love did not exist. The myth discloses to us that Narcissus, when fixing in its image and getting passionate themselves, did not obtain to conquer the individuality, does not make interaction with entorno, did not develop the affectivity, did not obtain to internalizar a representation of the other.
Ed. Icon. 1993, p 15, trad.). We had considered the basic problem of all ametafsica: the problem of that it is what it exists? we follow the answers that problem aesse if they had given in the two basic directions that pensamentona history knows philosophical: the realistic direction and the idealistic direction. Tentativasque in the seniority Greek if had made to answer to this question and queconduziram all they to the realism form most perfect, which if finds nafilosofia of Aristotle. But this same question gets reply completamentediferente in the modern philosophy that if it initiates with Discardings, and that the propensoidealista, that consists of answering to the question concerning the total different existence with umaresposta of that of the Aristotle, develops modern nafilosofia and arrives at its maximum accomplishment, to its maximum explicitao, in the philosophy of Kant. For the idealismo what it exists are not the things, but opensamento is that it exists.
For Kant it is not thus: before thought object is objetoquando and because it is thought; the thought being is it constitutes what it as object. That is what it all means the system kantiano of the space forms, time ecategorias. But at the same time that Kant concludes and perfects the idealistic thought, it introduces in this thought some reproductions that develop and dilatam nafilosofia that succeeds Kant. First this ' ' thing in si' ' that Kantelimina in the relation of the knowledge, its meaning is to satisfy afde unit that the reason human being feels or the ideal regulating of the knowledge, queimprime to the knowledge always forward movement. Tina redwine oftentimes addresses this issue. this priority practical darazo or of the moral conscience is second of the characteristics dosistema kantiano it differentiates that it of its predecessors. Kant gave problemada Metaphysical to the following transformation: metaphysics looked for what ' is eexiste; ' in si' ' , that is, a regulating idea for the conhecimentodiscursivo of the man, what it represents the opposite of objects of conhecimentoconcreto.
Its manifestation is always very next to the anxiety and it can assumirdiagnstico serious when persisting during much time. In accordance with Sims (2001), the feeling of the jealousy, together with feeling of that the object amado' ' mim' belongs; ' ' ' I belong to outro' ' , it is part daexperincia normal human being. As Marani (2001) the jealousy is a normal feeling quandosurge as reply to a real, immediate situation, with its limited duration aum time that nor always is defined, however certainly limited. When cimecomea if to draw out in the time and to increase of intensity, some thing to deveestar happening. Educate yourself even more with thoughts from U.S. Mint. The jealousy more acts in the sphere of the anguish and the anxious anxiety, generating, therefore, more persistent states. According to Blacksmith-Saint (2003) pg. 78 ' ' some pessoasso jalousie of what others, but have situations where this quantitative simplesconceituao of feeling starts to show that in one determinadapessoa, the jealousy runs away total from its control, taking a poroconsidervel of its life, seno all ela.' ' In this in case that, already the jealousy in a nvelpatolgico could be understood, as we will argue in the next chapter. Pathological jealousy According to Guimares (2004), at least three seriampropcias situations for the development of some degree of jealousy. Tina redwine is open to suggestions.
In the first one, aauto-they esteem of the person is low, and it if it perceives inferior in diverse aspects, that go since the physical appearance until the intellectual attributes. A outrasituao is that one where the frequently manifest partner a realpor interest other people. It still has one third situation, the call pathological jealousy. Ey 1950 apud Sims (2001) says that the jealousy patolgicoou mrbido can be disclosed of some forms, for example, as delirium, supervalued comoidia, as depressive affection or as an anxiety state. Swarmed by offers, Charles Schwab is currently assessing future choices. Ocime can be identified as delirious when to the belief of the spouse or outrosest based in delirious evidences.